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THE C.I.O. POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE AND
CONGRESSMAN MARTIN DIES' DEPARTURE
FROM CONGRESS:

•

LABOR'S INFLATED CLAIMS
by Dennis K. McDaniel

Congressman Martin Dies of Orange, Texas, in 1938 founded and was
named chairman of the House Special Committee on Cn-American
Activities, first known in popular parlance as the Dies Committee, later as
HUAC. This conservative congressman from the Southeast Texas oil-refining region was amply anti-union. Thus, the left side of the labor movement
(largely the CIa) was delighted when, contrary to all expectations, this
seven-term congressman suddenly announced on May 12, 1944 that he
would not stand for reelection that year, and that he was leaving Congress
and politics. Dies' decision puzzled political observers, while journalists
generally accepted the CIa claim that it had scared Dies out.
The scholarly record accumulated in the intervening years shows that
the historians followed the journalists' lead in misinterpreting the event.
Here we will try to demonstrate how Dies' retirement in 1944 was mi sconstrued when it occurred, and how it has remained misunderstood virtually
until today.
The miscomprehension began when the labor movement - the CIa
and its Political Action Committee in particular - immediately took credit
in 1944 for pushing Dies out of Congress. At that time the CIa badly wanted to get rid of Dies, and just weeks before his surprise withdrawal columnist Drew Pearson had repeated CIO claims that the union was getting into
position in Texas' Second Congressional District to vote Dies out. The fortuitous timing of Pearson's column made the CIO claim immediately plausible when Dies quit a few weeks later. The CIa and its Political Action
Committee reinforced the belief by crowing over the accomplishment.
From the time Dies withdrew, the CIa victory claim spread through
much of the media, was repeated endlessly, and finally became so
ingrained that every scholar who discussed labor in this period invariably
credited the CIO and its Political Action Committee with victory over the
Texas reactionary. The reality was more mundane.
In 1984 a graduate student at the University of Houston, Patience
Evans, in a master's thesis that was a first-class piece of historical analysis,
showed that Pearson and the CIa were entirely wrong in 1944, and that
had Dies stayed in the election he unquestionably would have retained his
seat. Building on Evans' discoveries, I found evidence in Dies' letters written early in 1944 that he was confident he would win ifhe ran.
Dermis K. McDaniel
Penn.~yJvan hi.
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Evans provided evidence for her conclusion by examining the Texas
electoral system, and also by looking at Dies' successful electoral record,
his district's demography, and the poll taxes paid there in 1944. She found
that the CIa's claimed int1ux of new union voters (some 70,000) in the district - registered, paid up, and ready to throw Dies out - was nonexistent. I
Evans located the origin of the myth in Pearson's "Washington MerryGo-Round" column of April 1, 1944, a piece which made its appearance a
providential six weeks before Dies' withdrawal. Pearson apparently got his
infonnation about the 70,000 voters from Sidney Hillman or CIa sources,
and the canard that the CIa could drive Dies out started its long life. As
recently as 1989, respected labor historian Nelson Lichtenstein repeated
the fable, and not long before, in 1987, the aged battler George Seldes, who
claimed to have had a role in the Dies dismissal at In Fact magazine,
repeated the yarn with particularly gratuitous exaggerations. And they were
not alone_~
Surprisingly. Evans found that the error actually had been uncovered
immediately in 1944. The arch-conservative Dallas Morning News studied
Pearson's report, looked at the paid-up poll taxes in Dies' District, and
reported that there had been no massive influx of union member voters.
But that revelation was not widely disseminated. 3
While the Dallas Morning News did not explain how voting and nonvoting then worked in Texas, we can do so: the electoral laws in effect in
1944 aimed to prevent voting. The law required lengthy residency before
registration: one year in the state, six months in the county, and ninety days
in the precinct. Moreover, a poll tax had to be paid, and it had to be paid in
person in January - before potential voters knew if there was going to be a
contest that might make voting worthwhile that year. This meant simply
that the legislature had erected many barners against voting; poll tax payments had to be repeated every year and many residents were ineligible to
register because of recent changes of re~idence, The potential voter had to
have a decisive interest to hop all the hurdles.
Moreover, the Democratic Party primary - the real election in Texas at
the time - was white only until the Supreme Court struck down the race
rule in 1944. In the spring of 1944 essentially no blacks were registered in
the Democratic Party in Dies' District. ~
No huge influx of new white voters could be found, either. The poll
tax records showed 66,295 paid in the district in 1940,61,009 in 1942, and
75.924 in 1944. The net increase from 1940 was only about 10,000, and the
percentage increase from 1942 about twenty-four percent. a substantial
increase but not nearly enough to dent Dies' impressive incumbency position. And this was true even though approximately fifty-seven percent of
all voters in the district were in the two industrialized counties of Jefferson
and Orange (and presumably, therefore, more open to labor's appeals).5
Dies was electorally strong in the district before 1944, and strong long
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afterward. In the Senate race in 1941 he garnered fifty-seven percent of the
vote against W. Lee "Pappy" Q'Daniel (the winner), Lyndon Johnson, and
others. When Dies returned to politics in 1952 he got sixty-four percent of
the district's vote in a large primary field for the Texas at-large House seat. 6
In 1944 the relatively few and new shipyard and refinery workers registered in Dies' district did not necessarily favor change, and did not necessarily oppose Dies. While a majority usually voted for CIO union certification at the shipyard or refinery, a substantial minority opposed the union.
The new arrivals were not class-conscious workers relocated from the
industrial Northeast; most were educationally deprived men and women
from fanns and little towns in the South who believed the usual conservative shibboleths. They might vote for the union to raise pay, but at the polls
they were capable of choosing almost anyone because they did not understand the most ordinary left-right distinctions; and they maintained traditional racism. No case can be made that they were progressives. 7
When Dies made his announcement in May 1944, people who knew
Lone Star politics - the Texas delegation in the House of Representatives,
for ex.ample - understood that he could not be defeated in his district. They
dismissed as improbable his stories about ill-health and desire not to turn
into a professional politician. and tried to figure out the "real" reason for
his departure. They could not ask him because he stayed in Texas, as he
had been in the habit of doing after March 1944. The Texas delegation gossiped and concluded that someone must have evidence of a Dies peccadillo, and was holding the information over his head to force him out. The
Texans could think of no explanation but blackmail for Dies' departure.
They had no evidence for such speculation; it evolved simply because
Dies' sLated reasons werc incredible to them. Here Dies was done an injustice insofar as the gossip turned on sexual innuendo. Dies apparently took
money during his career as HUAC chairman, but that was not known to his
House colleagues among whom Dies always had the reputation of being
fiscally honest; inasmuch as the congressional gossips sought an explanation in a hidden sex escapade, they were almost certainly wrong. Dies had
a weakness for money, not women. 8
Congressman Martin Dies' son, Judge Martin Dies, provided a
straightforward explanation for Dies' withdrawal announcement in May
1944: he said his father thought he had cancer of the throat and was going
to die. This in part conflrms Dies' statement in the New York Times in
1944 that he was under the care of Dr. Frederick Fowler for a "throat disorder '" which .. , may require a serious operation."9 Dies, a heavy cigar
smoker. was frightened, for he apparently did for a brief time think he had
throat cancer.
Of greater importance, however, was the fact that he was discouraged
because his political career was going nowhere. For him that meant he was
not heading for the Senate anytime soon, and maybe never. He had been
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trounced badly in most of Texas in his Senate effort in 1941, and that had
discouraged him profoundly. His premonition in 1944 that he might never
get to the Senate turned out to be true, though he did try one more time, in
1957.
Another factor favoring Dies' decision was that he had become financially comfortable by 1944. His oil leases, real estate, bond holdings, and
congressional earnings, added to the money he had accepted under the
table to influence his behavior as chairman or HUAC, amounted to tidy
sums of income and accumulation. He felt that he could live the rest of his
life without working. Insofar as financial need was concerned, that was
probably true. When he did go back to lawyering a year or so later, and
when he reentered politics in 1952, he did not do so for money, but in order
to have something to do, and to try one last time to get to the Senate. to
Finally, in the years after his Senate-race defeat Dies had been by
turns ready to quit, or willing to go on, depending upon his moon. There is
evidence that as early as the Spring of 1942 he was considering buying a
house in Lufkin and retiring there. And right after his withdrawal he let slip
in a private letter that "to retire to private life ... is really what I have wanted to do for a long time."11
As it happened, the early months of 1944 had been one of his liveliest
periods since the Senate-race disaster in 1941. He shook some of the
lethargy of the intervening years, and temporarily regained the enthusiasm
for politics that he had exhibited until 1941. In January 1944 hc began to
work on his congres&ional reelection campaign, studying means to head off
potential problems - as he had always done in the 19305. But in 1944 there
were no problems. In January, for example, he easily obtained the promise
of an endorsement from AFL President William Green, who presumably
saw it as a way to take a whack at the CIO. Green offered to mail his
endorsement of Dies either directly to the congressman or to the local labor
council. Dies opted for the latter course, and Green sent the letter to the
Beaumont Trades and Labor Assembly. But Green either mishandled the
mailing or sought intentionally to railroad the local counell, for he sent it to
the Beaumont Enterprise in advance, with the result that Green's letter
appeared on the paper's front page on February 1, 1944, before the nominal
labor-group addressees had received their copy. That made them angry, and
they passed a huffy resolution aimed at the Beaumont Enterpri,!}"e, which
printed a story about it on February 3. It was pointless for the labor leaders
to attack the Enterprise or even Dles when it was William Green who was
at fault. This teapot typhoon, insignificant in itself, showed how close Dies
was to Green and how powerless local labor assemblies were in relation to
their national leadership. It also showed how rehably the biggest newspaper in the district, the Beaumont Enterprise, kept Dies infonned and how it
served as his regional mouthpiece. '2
At this point Dies was less worried about his re-election than was his
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ever-analytical Port Arthur political advisor, Postmaster Stewart Martin. 13
The latter sent Dies unusually complete intelligence reports on local attitudes while Dies in turn mailed a steady stream of material to the cooperative Enterprise. Dies' confidence grew daily, and by late March he wrote
that "a group of my friends made a very careful survey of the district and
advised me that the comments of 75 percent of the people were very strong
in my favor. In fact, my friends believe that I am stronger today than ever
before." Dies' friends were absolutely correct. 14
That is the last of Dies' cheery optimism. On Sunday, April 23, 1944,
Dies traveled to Dallas by car, but became ill en route and turned back to
Jasper. Texas, where one of his two Texas homes was located. Shortly
afterward he went to Galveston or Houston (the record is contradictory) for
a medical examination and learned about the possible cancer. With that, the
rush of memory of his Senate-race humiliation, and the surge of fear drove
him to throw in the towel. Illness, discouragement, wealth, laziness, and a
political broken heart drove Dies back to Texas; it was not the CIO or the
Communists that got him, as he later claimed. Until the psychological
excuse that the ill-health assessment provided, he had been confident that
he could beat them. I.,
Dies learned almost immediately that nothing imminent threatened his
health. Within four days of his withdrawal he wrote matter-of-factly to
Evalyn Walsh McLean, the Washington socialite who had long befriended
him and Mrs. Dies, that he was returning to Houston "next week for a tinal
check-up" and expressing the belief that "rest and freedom from the strain
under which I have lived and worked so long will do more than medical
science." Considering his record of frequently absenting himself from the
House of Representatives for months on end, it was hard to see that he had
been under much strain in the later years.
Dies also tried to convince Mrs. McLean that he "was unable to conduct a campaign. and [he] could not afford to submit [this] case to the people without being heard." This was untrue; he would have won whether the
Texas Second District heard his case or not. Dies was simply making
excuses to cover his desire, evergrowing since 1941, to indulge himself. 16
As of May 13, 1944, the only thing the world knew was that Martin
Dies, founder and chairman of the feared House Special Committee on UnAmerican Activities, was leaving Congress. Labor thought, or claimed to
think. that it had scared him out. Insiders believed that he must have been
framed or blackmailed. But the real reasons were personal - political disappointment. a touch of laziness. and a health scare.

For several years, no one talked much about Martin Dies and his
departure. He was out of politics and Joe McCarthy did not appear until six
years afterward as a significant public figure who might be compared to
him. and there the matter rested until Dies again won election to the House
of Representatives in 1952, this time as Texas' Congressman-at-Large.
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Beginning with this campaign, Dies. paradoxically, but for his own reasons, helped propound the myth that the CIa and Communists had driven
him out of public life in 1944. As he reentered politics in 1952 he had to
account for his earlier premature retirement. Since the actual reasons largely were ignoble, hardly amounting to more than laziness and a brief though admittedly frightening - touch of ill-health, he needed to invent a
larger explanation, and the Communists and the CIa were it - thus his
claim that they had gone after him viciously in 1944. In 1952 he said that
"I quit public life before [in 1944] because the communists had plagued
me, harassed me, poisoned the minds of my friends and other people about
me ... [so] that I just felt I had to quit."17 And as Dies made clear elsewhere,
he considered the CIa to be virtually synonymous with the Communist
Party in the United States at that time.
Some labor leaders, too, helped promote the legend in later years in
the sense that they claimed that Dies had not been such a big fish to land,
that he had not been as imposing in the early 1940s as some people
claimed. Southeast Texas labor leader and former oil-refinery organizer,
Morris Akin, claimed in an interview in 1971 that Dies actually had helped
union organization in Southeast Texas because the wild charges he made
against the CIO rebounded against him and made workers want to join the
union. But that view represented an inaccurate memory of a past seen
through rose-colored spectacles~ it was made in a period when labor still
deceived itself in the belief that it was strong politically. In that context,
Akin may have thought that reaction to Dies had assisted CIO organizing
in lefferson County, but in 1942 the state CIa, and in 1944 the national
CIO, had certainly not felt that way. They had understood that Dies was a
powerful threat, and they wanted to get rid of him. In 1942 the Texas CIO
convention resolved to work for Dies' "retirement," and two years later
Sidney Hillman's CIa Political Action Committee very much wanted to
defeat Dies although, a~ has been indicated, they were quite incapable of
doing it. t8
Any consideration of Martin Dies' career inevitably elicits a comparison with that of Senator Joseph McCarthy. This has long been true, and in
1953 such comparisons came with special frequency; Dies was again
prominent in the public eye as he returned to Congress after an eight-year
hiatus, while McCarthy had become famous in the interim, and was then
riding high - his downfall still almost two years in the future. McCarthy
was the name on everyone's lips. The newspapers backing him were those
whose support Dies had enjoyed in the days of his own eminence McCormick, Hearst, and the innumerable small-city, right-wing papers that
are such a persistent feature of North American life. In 1953, a typlcal
McCormick editorial stated that "they are ganging up on Sen. McCarthy
these days exactly a& they ganged up on Rep. Dies."19 During the McCarthy
years, 1950-1955, newspapers reiterated a version of that claim: not only
had "they" ganged up on Dies, but he had been silenced. Examples of this
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(among many) appeared in Giddings, Texas; Prescott, Arizona; Tulsa,
Oklahoma; and Houston newspapers. 20
Dies had not been forced out of Congress in 1944. but had left under
his own power for genuinely personal reasons. Furthermore, he was not
afterward "silenced," but spoke often with at least good coverage in Texas
from 1945 until his return to Congress. The Hearst comparison of Dies and
McCanhy was spurious when written. And although McCarthy was moreor-less silenced in 1955. the "they" who did it certainly covered a wide bipartisan range.
Probably the best proof of all this is that as late as 1959 the John Birch
magazine was writing in a review/reminder of Dies' old book, The Trojan
Horse (] 940), that "Martin Dies paid for his shrewd insight with his political life .... [T]he New Deal - Fair Deal Establishment systematically
destroyed the health and political career of Martin Dies."21 That is pure
fantasy.
The belief that Dies had been "silenced" and drivcn out of public life.
which was earlier CIa propaganda staple, by the 1950s had become a myth
of the ultra-right. A look at the dates of the sources suggest that the tale
received its widest acceptance after 1950, implying that the CIa had not
been as effective in propagating the Dies fiction in ] 944-1953 as the right
was with its disinfonnation campaign after] 952. Paradoxically, the CIa
Political Actlon Committee was granted more legendary power by the right
than it had ever won for itself; the reason was that the right exploited the
legend as part of the anti-communist frenzy which it so successfully generated in those years.
Happily. humor may be found in the midst of the right-ring hysteria of
the 19505, When Martin Dies travelled to Jackson. Mississippi, in 1957 to
present an ami-civil rights speech in the municipal auditorium. a historycreating Southern columnist. Florence Si11ers Ogden. confessed in a local
paper thaL in 1944 she had "grieved when thousands of outsidc workers
were sent down to his district in Texas and stayed there long enough to
vote and defeat Mr. Dies for Congress."n This was totally absurd, as we
have seen, yet it shows the effectiveness of the right's campaign. for this
lady had embellished the Dies. story in her own mind to the point where
Dies had not withdrawn before the primary. but actually had run and been
defeated by the CIO.
The facts were that the CIa had never been close to defeating Martin
Dies in Southeast Texas or anywhere else. And the only reason that anyone
today thinks that it could have must be credited to the propaganda campaign that the right-wing parties have forwarded since the 1950s.
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